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Abstract
This exploratory study investigates the manifold conceptions of the internal auditing (IA) of risk culture prevalent among 
four influential actors of the financial sector—regulators, normalizers, consultants, and implementers. By inductive analy-
sis of 20 interviews and 295 documents, we illustrate a two-step interpretive scheme utilized by the four actors in their IA 
approaches of risk culture: defining broad goals and designing visibility schemes. The visibility schemes were tied to the 
demarcation, measurement, as well as the IA data collection techniques of risk culture. Our results indicate two dichotomous 
interpretations among the four actors concerning the IA of risk culture. The first interpretation, prevalent among regulators 
and implementers, promotes the control of risk culture primarily through verification. The second interpretation, adopted by 
consultants and normalizers, promotes the control of risk culture by IA along with the empowerment of employees through 
training programs. Our results not only contribute to understanding IA expansions, specifically to non-tangible domains 
such as risk culture but also enrich the literature exploring the mechanisms different stakeholders utilize to shape weakly 
professionalized IA practices.
Keywords Internal audit · Risk culture · Auditability · Financial sector
Introduction
Recent banking scandals and failures are often linked to 
rampant and inappropriate risk culture that allows exces-
sive risk-taking in banks (Carretta et al. 2017; Palermo et al. 
2016). As a reaction, regulators such as the Financial Stabil-
ity Board (FSB), the Basel Committee on Banking Supervi-
sion (BCBS), and the European Banking Authority (EBA) 
issued broad guidelines on risk culture control, involving 
internal auditing (IA) processes (Ring et al. 2016). These 
regulatory initiatives stirred a controversial debate on the 
IA of risk culture among various stakeholders: the profes-
sional bodies—the Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA) and 
the Institute of Risk Management (IRM)—hereby referred 
to as the normalizers, consultants, and practitioners/imple-
menters (Palermo et al. 2016). While the debate provoked 
various stakeholders suggesting approaches on the IA of risk 
culture, it did not result in a shared understanding (Ring 
et al. 2016).
This lack of a shared understanding among the different 
stakeholders provided empirical motivation for this study 
to understand their viewpoints. Further motivation for the 
paper arose from the three underlying challenges in the 
application of IA to risk culture. First, unlike organizational 
processes such as risk management where specific protocols, 
process ownership, and departments provide tangible bound-
aries for IA (Hall et al. 2015; Mikes 2009, 2011), risk culture 
concerns the intangible domain of individual motivations 
and behaviors (Cornia et al. 2016). This raises ethical con-
cerns on how far IA should colonize and control employees 
through the IA of risk culture (Ezzy 2001; McCabe 2014). 
Second, involvement of different stakeholders (Erasmus and 
Coetzee 2018; Roussy and Brivot 2016), application to a 
variety of processes (Hayne and Free 2014; Spira and Page 
2003), heterogeneity (Arena and Jeppesen 2015; Jiang et al. 
2018), and unclear ethical guidelines (Friedberg 1998) have 
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sometimes challenged IA’s abilities in achieving its ethical 
ideal of independence and objectivity (Everett and Tremblay 
2014; Neu et al. 2013). The compromised nature of exist-
ing IA practices raises concern on how IA could assure risk 
culture (Christopher et al. 2009; Mihret 2014). Third, the 
problem of the IA of risk culture is exacerbated by an exist-
ing incoherent understanding of risk culture, its production, 
or alteration within organizations (Palermo et al. 2016), and 
its relationship with the organizational culture (Schein 1990, 
2004).
In addition to the three challenges mentioned above, a 
paucity of literature on “how IA expands to new domains” 
(cf. Chambers and Odar 2015; Gramling et al. 2004; Parker 
and Johnson 2017) and “how different stakeholders conceive 
IA expansions” (cf. Erasmus and Coetzee 2018; Roussy 
and Brivot 2016) created a fertile ground to understand the 
manifold viewpoints on the IA expansion to assure on risk 
culture. Consequently, our investigation focused on analyz-
ing (1) how different actors—regulators, normalizers, con-
sultants, and implementers—conceive the IA of risk culture 
and (2) what type of approaches they embrace to audit risk 
culture.
Given the contextual ambiguities and contemporary 
nature of different stakeholders’ approaches to the IA of risk 
culture (Palermo et al. 2016; Ring et al. 2016), we conducted 
a qualitative field study involving different stakeholders to 
explore their emergent ideas inductively (Power and Gend-
ron 2015). Following Roussy and Brivot (2016), the induc-
tive examination involved analysis of 20 interviews and 295 
documents on the IA of risk culture by the four actor groups 
(regulators, normalizers, consultants, and implementers).
Our findings indicate that regulators and implementers 
promoted the control of risk culture based on “regular” IA 
activities. The regulators restricted themselves to high-level 
guidelines and promoted the IA of risk culture as a new 
check and balance to mitigate what they observed as wide-
spread cultural problems within banks. The implementers 
were reluctant in implementing any new “costly” changes 
to their IA activities in what they claimed were strategy and 
business model matters and thus included some elements of 
verification in their existing IA activities. Consultants and 
normalizers, in contrast, promoted a cautious approach to 
risk culture “control” by IA along with empowerment of 
employees through training. Motivated to keep their thought 
leadership, the normalizers reconciled efforts from the regu-
lators and the consultants to promote a library of toolkits and 
a bricolage of ideas to guide implementing organizations. 
The consultants utilized this as an opportunity to monetize 
new “value-adding” solutions by promoting “comprehen-
sive” control frameworks (including IA) and widespread 
employee empowerment. Our results on the heterogeneity 
of viewpoints among different stakeholders may seem unsur-
prising given the ambiguity of the object of IA (risk culture 
in our case) and variations in the current IA practices. How-
ever, our results posit three important implications.
First, the absence of implementers’ support or coercive 
regulation on changing the conventional notions and tech-
niques raises doubt on whether IA would be able to suc-
cessfully transition from its current paradigm of assuring 
tangible processes to the paradigm of assuring intangibles, 
such as risk culture and ethical values. There is a danger 
that a direct transfer of knowledge, without critical con-
siderations on the intangibility of risk culture, could lead 
to mere ritualistic thinking among implementers promot-
ing a tick-box-based verification approach rendering IA of 
risk culture inefficient or ineffective (Erasmus and Coetzee 
2018; McCabe 2014; Power 1999). Second, the control and 
governance approach, if extended to employees’ behavior, 
raises ethical concerns where excessive controls might rob 
employees of their individuality and dissociate them from 
critical and moral decision-making (leading to the coloni-
zation of employees’ emotional self) (Ezzy 2001; McCabe 
2014). Third, approaches from normalizers and consultants 
to the implementation of IA as a control mechanism bal-
anced by the empowerment of employees through training 
seems theoretically plausible but pragmatically challenging 
to attain (McCabe 2014; Simons 1995). In practice, while 
empowered employees might use their entrepreneurial flair 
to contribute to value creation using their innovative/criti-
cal ideas, they might be difficult to control and could harm 
organizational well-being (Simons 1995).
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: “IA Expan-
sions to New Domains” problematizes the IA literature; 
“Research Approach” addresses the methodology; “Results” 
presents the findings; “Discussion” and “Conclusion” pre-
sent discussion and conclusions, respectively.
IA Expansions to New Domains
Waves of corporate and banking scandals in the last three 
decades have punctured trust in firms’ behavior (Neu et al. 
2013; Parker and Johnson 2017) and explicated employees’ 
dissociation from the moral and ethical compass (Arel et al. 
2012; MacLean et al. 2015). The trust-deficit in corpora-
tions, coupled with a societal trust-deficit (Power 1997), has 
spurred regulatory demands for tighter control (Baud and 
Chiapello 2016; Chambers 2014; Collier and Zaman 2005). 
As a result, ethics and risk culture have been included in 
the ambit of IA (Palermo et al. 2016; Ring et al. 2016). 
However, the inclusion of risk culture poses several paradig-
matic challenges to the IA expansions. The most prominent 
being the non-tangible and unbounded nature of risk culture 
compared to existing IA applications to tangible processes 
(check introduction, paragraph 2 for details).
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Consequently, to understand the paradigmatic challenges 
of IA expansions to risk culture, we inductively examined 
(1) how different actors—regulators, normalizers, consult-
ants, and implementers—conceive the IA of risk culture and 
(2) what type of approaches they embrace to this aim. We 
informed our inductive investigation of the IA of risk culture 
by categorizing the extant literature on the expansion of IA 
into three distinct approaches and distilling knowledge from 
them.
The first approach, focusing on what internal auditors do 
(Roussy 2015), revealed problems with normative and ethi-
cal expectations of IA as an independent and objective assur-
ance and consultancy provider (Christopher et al. 2009). 
Commentators in this stream blamed the non-objectivity and 
non-independence of internal auditors on their role conflicts 
(Morgan 1980) and inter-role conflict in negotiations (Cohen 
et al. 2002; Roussy 2015; Roussy and Brivot 2016). For 
example, Roussy (2013) and Roussy and Rodrigue (2016) 
find that internal auditors team up with the auditee managers 
instead of with the audit committees and the boards. This 
siding with the auditee managers makes it comfortable for 
internal auditors in accessing data and information from the 
auditees (Fanning and David Piercey 2014; Goodwin and 
Yeo 2001). Norman et al. (2010) demonstrate that internal 
auditors perceive more personal threats when they report 
high levels of risk directly to the audit committee and thus 
mild down the reporting of high-level risks. Teaming up 
with auditee managers or threat perception results in com-
fort provision by internal auditors to the control committees 
and the board of organizations in their reporting (Sarens 
et al. 2009). While these studies teach us to understand IA 
practices by examining what internal auditors do and how 
they carry out their work, they only tell a one-sided story 
of IA work.
In contrast to the first approach, the second approach inves-
tigates varying goals, configuration, competence, ethics, and 
techniques of IA in different contexts, especially risk man-
agement (Arena et al. 2010, 2017; Castanheira et al. 2009; de 
Zwaan et al. 2011; Vinnari and Skærbæk 2014) and corporate 
governance (Arena and Jeppesen 2015; Roussy and Rodrigue 
2016). For example, Sarens and Lamboglia (2014) suggest 
varying competence and knowledge requirements for internal 
auditors in different domains. In this regard, some scholars 
suggest the rotation of employees to enrichen the knowledge 
of internal auditors (Burton et al. 2015; Christ et al. 2015). 
While rotation might improve the quality of reporting (Christ 
et al. 2015), it could discourage employees and newcomers 
from joining IA teams by pointing to the general nature of the 
IA work (Bartlett et al. 2016). In a similar vein, studies explor-
ing outsourcing of IA to third parties suggest that outsourcing 
improves the independence and objectivity of IA, but discour-
ages auditee managers from sharing information, resulting in 
lower audit quality (Abdolmohammadi 2013; Caplan et al. 
2000; Prawitt et al. 2012; Speklé et al. 2007). Overall, these 
studies reveal that due to lack of content knowledge on the 
heterogeneity of processes (including risk management, cor-
porate governance, and internal control), IA has developed its 
techniques to merely verify the process of decision-making 
(Pentland 2000; Power 1999). While these studies teach us 
to look at rationales and approaches of IA, they ignore the 
interactions and expectations of different stakeholders on IA 
rationales and approaches.
The third approach explains IA by studying involvement 
and expectations of different stakeholders (Erasmus and 
Coetzee 2018; Roussy and Brivot 2016). Studying differing 
expectations of the major stakeholders and their influence on 
IA becomes essential considering the influence of a variety 
of stakeholders on IA practices (Arena and Jeppesen 2009; 
Covaleski et al. 2003), as repeatedly shown through its histori-
cal development (Hayne and Free 2014; Parker and Johnson 
2017; Spira and Page 2003). Scholars promoting this approach 
study influence of the auditee managers (Sarens and De Beelde 
2006), external auditors (Brody et al. 1998; Felix et al. 2001; 
Mat Zain et al. 2015), audit committees (Goodwin 2003), 
and regulators (Chambers 2014) in making IA indispensa-
ble. Furthermore, this emerging stream of research explores 
“interaction,” “influence,” “power asymmetry,” and “control” 
along with typical contract-based relationships to explain IA 
practices (Mihret 2014)., e.g., oversight or closeness of audit 
committees to IA functions has been shown to enhance the 
independence of IA functions (Abbott et al. 2010). Goodwin 
(2003) goes a step further and demonstrates that the account-
ing experience of audit committee members enables them 
to assess the work of internal auditors, thereby promoting 
the independence of the IA function. Sarens and De Beelde 
(2006) show how the expectations of senior managers from 
IA on monitoring risk management, internal control, and cor-
porate culture positively influence their work. Some studies 
within this approach cover historical contingencies and dif-
ferent rationales of IA expansions (Chambers and Odar 2015; 
Parker and Johnson 2017; Spira and Page 2003). This stream 
teaches us to identify key stakeholders and include their views 
in understanding IA expansions. However, like the other two 
approaches, the questioning has been limited to exploring IA 
as a control and governance mechanism (Mihret 2014) or an 
independence and objective function (Christopher et al. 2009; 
Stewart and Subramaniam 2010) within the purview of its 
application to processes.
Research Approach
Research Strategy
We conducted a qualitative, explorative field study to induc-
tively examine the different stakeholders’ approaches to 
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the IA of risk culture (Power and Gendron 2015; Roussy 
and Rodrigue 2016). In doing so, we adopted a social con-
structivist approach, accepting that knowledge resides in a 
group of actors who share a practice or a set of problems 
(Berger and Luckmann 1966; Wahlström 2009). The induc-
tive approach informed the theoretically understudied IA 
expansion approaches with insights from the new empirical 
context of the IA of risk culture (Gioia et al. 2013; Power 
and Gendron 2015).
Data Collection
We focused on the European context by relying on two data 
sources—interviews and documents on the IA of risk culture 
by the four actors (i.e., regulators, normalizers, consultants, 
and implementers).
Semi‑structured Interviews
Twenty semi-structured and explorative interviews, lasting 
from 30 to 120 min, with key informants were conducted 
(see Table 1). The informants from the regulators, normal-
izers, and consulting organizations were selected to discuss 
their ideas on the IA of risk culture and collect information 
and documents authored/promoted by them on the IA of 
risk culture. The informants from the implementers such as 
risk managers, internal auditors, and members of the inter-
est organizations were selected opportunistically, as we had 
access to these informants through our prior engagements 
with them. The interviews focused on understanding the con-
ceptions of the IA of risk culture, its linkages to other control 
systems, and broad IA techniques. Informants were asked 
to freely draw from their experience with control systems 
within organizations, such as internal control, risk manage-
ment, and corporate governance on the IA of risk culture.
Documents
Overall, 295 documents1 detailing the views of the four 
actors (i.e., regulators, normalizers, consultants, and 
implementers) concerning IA of risk culture were selected. 
Hundred-and-eighty-five of these documents belonged 
to the regulators—the Financial Stability Board (FSB), 
the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), 
and the European Banking Authority  (EBA). These 
Table 1  Interviews No. Organization Informant
Implementers
 1 Interest organization-1 Chief analyst, risk and audit
 2 Interest organization-1 Chief jurist, risk and compliance
 3 Interest organization-2 Senior legal advisor, risk and compliance
 4 Large bank-1 Audit and compliance head
 5 Large bank-1 Risk head
 6 Large bank-2 Internal auditor
 7 Large bank-2 Internal auditor
 8 Large bank-2 Chief credit risk officer
 9 Large bank-3 Internal auditor
 10 Large bank-3 Internal auditor
Consultants
 11 Big-4 Partner, financial services (risk and compliance)
 12 Big-4 Director, IFRS services
 13 Big-4 Director, financial services (risk and compliance)
 14 Big-4 Manager, risk and IA services
 15 Protiviti Director, financial services (internal audit)
 16 Protiviti Manager, financial services (internal audit)
Regulators
 17 BCBS Member secretariat
 18 FSB Member secretariat
Normalizers
 19 IIA Technical manager, Italy
 20 IIA Global director, financial services audit
1 Private documents provided by the informants are marked in the 
relevant tables.
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documents comprise standards, guidelines, and the lobby-
ing responses (from other regulators, normalizers, consult-
ants, and implementers) on IA, risk culture, risk appetite, 
risk governance, and corporate governance (see Table 2 
for details).
Another 47 documents from the Institute of Internal 
Auditors (IIA), the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations 
of the Tredway Commission (COSO), and the Institute of 
Risk Management (IRM) were collected to understand the 
perspectives of the normalizers (see Table 3 for details).
Additionally, 58 documents issued after the finan-
cial crisis by the big four consulting firms (PWC, E&Y, 
Deloitte, KPMG) and Protiviti2 on risk culture including 
IA approaches were analyzed. We also collected 5 docu-
ments from the implementers for the analysis (see Table 4 
for details).
Data Analysis
Following guidelines of naturalistic inquiry (Lincoln and 
Guba 1985) and constant comparison techniques (Corbin 
and Strauss 1990), we continuously analyzed the data dur-
ing collection. This continuous analysis proved useful in 
assessing areas that needed more data points. Our analy-
sis included several steps. First, relevant data points were 
selected and analyzed separately for the four actors: regula-
tors, normalizers, consultants, and implementers. Second, 
key historical events were identified. Third, open in vivo 
coding of the empirical data, using simple text codes in the 
language of the informants, was performed. Fourth, axial 
coding allowed the grouping of different in vivo empirical 
codes into second-order theoretical themes (Corbin and 
Strauss 1990; Gioia et al. 2013). Finally, the relationship 
between the emergent second-order themes connected the 
empirical data to our emergent theoretical framework.
Theoretical Constructs
The approach of identifying theoretical constructs in an 
inductive rather than a deductive manner was inspired by 
Gioia et al. (2013). Gioia et al. (2013) suggest focusing on 
the language of informants while investigating new empiri-
cal phenomena (in our case the IA of “non-tangible” risk 
culture) that differ paradigmatically from existing phenom-
ena (in our case the IA of any tangible process—risk man-
agement or corporate governance). Gioia et al. (2013) argue 
that ignoring the language of informants and focusing on an 
a priori theoretical construct in such cases could result in a 
confirmation bias towards existing theoretical understanding 
and missed opportunity on construct refinement and theory 
building through new empirical paradigms. The table below 
Table 2  Documents from regulators
a 38 Lobbying responses on 2011 consultation on internal audit func-
tion (regulators: 1, normalizers: 8, banks: 8, interest organizations: 
15, consultants: 6)
b 32 Lobbying responses on risk appetite consultation in 2013 (regula-
tors: 0, normalizers: 3, banks: 1, interest organizations: 22, consult-
ants: 6); 28 Lobbying responses on risk culture consultation in 2013 
(regulators: 4, normalizers: 3, banks: 3, interest organizations: 13, 
consultants: 5)
Actors No. of 
docu-
ments
Comments
BCBS 52 (Standards and guideline: 11, news: 3, lobbying 
responses to standards and guidelines:  38a)
FSB 73 (Standards and guideline: 5, news: 4, lobbying 
responses to standards and guidelines:  60b, 
reports: 4)
EBA 60 (Standards and guideline: 5, news and other: 55)
Total 185
Table 3  Documents on Normalizers
Actors No. of documents Comments
IIA 21 14 public (reports: 8, survey:1, 
webpages:3, standards:2) and 7 
private (reports: 4, surveys: 2, 
workshop power point:1)
IRM 6 3 public reports, 3 public web 
pages
COSO 20 17 public reports, 2 public web 
pages, 1 public power point
Total 47
Table 4  Documents on Consultants and Implementers
Actors No. of 
docu-
ments
Comments
Consultants
 Deloitte 17 (16 public reports; 1 privately shared)
 E&Y 12 (10 public reports; 2 privately shared by 
the IIA)
 KPMG 16 (16 public reports)
 Protiviti 3 (2 public reports, 1 privately shared)
 PwC 10 (9 public reports, 1 privately shared)
 Total 58 (53 publicly available and 5 privately 
shared)
Implementers
5 (3 public; 2 private − 1 shared by the IIA 
and 1 by the implementer)
2 Protiviti was included because the IIA and the IRM indicated 
their collaboration with Protiviti on the issue. Protiviti also consists 
of the remnants of the IA business of the previous large firm Arthur 
Andersen.
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details the ways we formulated the two theoretical constructs 
inductively (Table 5).
The first theoretical construct that we identified con-
cerned visibility and auditability scheme of the object of 
audit. It comprised three sub-constructs: boundary iden-
tification, calculation, and adaptation of the techniques of 
the IA. Boundary identification was the first step towards 
making the object of audit visible. The boundary identifica-
tion was mostly linked to understanding what to include and 
what to exclude (Abbott 1995; Bowker and Star 1996; Mikes 
2009). Here, more specifically, we found the idea of “demar-
cating the object of audit” (Power 1997, 1999). The second 
step that emerged was calculation linked to the aspiration 
of rendering “organizational spaces knowable and govern-
able” (Miller and O’Leary 1987; Miller and Power 2013; 
Vaivio 1999, 2006). Here, we found the use of both quan-
titative measures (calculations) (Mikes 2011; Power 2004) 
and qualitative areas of assessment (qualculations) (Callon 
and Law 2005; Callon and Muniesa 2005; Cochoy 2008). 
Third, we found techniques of IA aimed at collecting data 
for calculations/qualculations (Power 1999). In this study, 
we limited our focus to broad techniques used in collecting 
the information about the object of audit. Consequently, we 
mainly focused on field techniques of interviews, surveys, 
questionnaires, and internal company data sources on pro-
cesses and steering documents informing opinions on behav-
ior and risk calculations. To keep the findings of this study 
comprehensible, we excluded data collection and theoriza-
tion on auditor judgment techniques.
In the process of theorizing on making the object of audit 
visible and auditable, we also found that the visibility and 
auditability schemes were tied to another theoretical con-
struct that we name as broad goals (Power 1999) and mostly 
represented a ‘style of thinking’ (Dean 1999; Foucault 
1988a; Miller and Rose 2008; Rose and Miller 1992). This 
style of thinking was either explicated by the informants or 
mentioned in the documents. We found different broad goals 
among different actors (Dean 1999, pp. 17, 40).
Trustworthiness of Data and Analysis
We followed several tactics to enhance the trustworthiness 
of our data collection (Gioia et al. 2013). First, guaranteed 
anonymity allowed informants to speak their minds and 
present their viewpoints freely. Second, semi-structured 
interviews reduced the interviewer bias by limiting inter-
viewer interference. Third, paraphrasing and confirming our 
interpretations and claims with the interviewees during the 
interviews reduced interviewer bias. Fourth, talking about 
recent events, helped counter the recall biases in the inter-
viewees’ accounts.
We also followed several steps to ensure trustworthi-
ness of our data analysis. First, use of a computer program 
rendered transparency, traceability, and replicability to 
our analysis. Second, triangulation of information and fact 
checking during data analysis imparted credibility and valid-
ity to the constructs. Third, historical analysis allowed for a 
better grasp of the contextual factors, enhancing the quality 
of theorization. Fourth, input from the scholars in account-
ing and management conferences enhanced the rigor of our 
results and analysis. Finally, the exposure of our process on 
the relationship between the empirical material and theo-
retical constructs in the previous sections imparts additional 
transparency and trustworthiness.
Table 5  Constructs
Empirical language Theoretical meaning Theoretical construct
Making the object of audit visible and auditable
 What is included
What is not included
Demarcation of things inside or outside (A. Abbott 1995; Bowker and Star 
1996)
Boundaries
 Areas of concern
Index and metrics
Qualitative assessment (Callon and Law 2005; Callon and Muniesa 2005; 
Cochoy 2008)
Quantitative assessment and counting (Power 2004)
Calculation
 Quantitative data: recorded and calculated 
metrics
 Qualitative field study: interview, survey, 
questionnaire
 Documental evidence: steering, manage-
ment system and process document
Concrete tasks and routines which allow IA to collect information (Power 
1999)
Techniques
Broad goals of IA
 Objective, purpose, or aim of IA of risk 
culture either spoken or found in docu-
ments
Rationale (Power 1999) Broad goals
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Results
Regulators: Framing Self‑Control, Blaming Practices
The European Union (EU) has a multilevel regulatory envi-
ronment: national, European, and international. While the 
national regulators (central banks, supervisory authorities or 
both) drive national standards/policies, the national parlia-
ments legalize national regulations/laws. On the European 
level, the European Banking Authority (EBA) (a European-
level supervisory authority of banks) influences standards/ 
policies; the European Parliament, the European Commis-
sion and the Council of Ministers drive the actual laws and 
regulations (including directives) binding member states. 
The European-level standards/policies, in turn, are affected 
by international regulators, most notably the Basel Com-
mittee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) and the Financial 
Stability Board (FSB)(Baud and Chiapello 2016; Palermo 
et al. 2016). Here, we restrict our analysis to the views of 
the three regulators, the FSB, the BCBS, and the EBA, as 
these regulators have shown recent interest in the IA of risk 
culture. The idea of the IA of risk culture among regulators 
is tied to two concerns: culture as a factor of financial crises 
and the need to address cultural problems by detailing addi-
tional guidelines on self-control.
Culture at financial institutions was one of the high-
lighted factors identified as an important factor con-
tributing to the financial crisis (Informant 18)
IA is there to bridge the asymmetry of information 
between the principle and the agent. […] That already 
has been an issue [with IA] in some banks. The inde-
pendence of IA was not sufficient [during the crisis]. 
(Informant 17)
At FSB, the discussion on culture started with con-
cern about the governance of risk management culture 
and originated in an October 2011 progress-report of 
the FSB to the G20. The progress report identified risk 
governance as critical to ensuring a strong risk manage-
ment culture. Strengthening of the risk governance was 
advocated by identifying a well-defined risk appetite 
framework and having strong chief risk officers (CRO), 
chief executive officer (CEO), and audit committee (a top-
down approach). The discussion was boosted further in 
April 2012, when the FSB sought opinions from different 
national supervisors during its thematic review on risk 
governance. The paper and consultation documents on the 
thematic review of risk governance mainly linked IA to a 
risk control framework without offering details on control 
or IA approaches of risk management culture.
The discussion at the FSB on the governance of risk 
management culture later changed to the governance of 
risk culture in November 2012, when the FSB progress-
report to the G20 promoted a more detailed understanding 
on the governance of risk culture. The document identi-
fied strong risk culture as an essential element of good 
governance. The document recommended supervisors to 
explicitly assess risk culture at firms. Several qualitative 
areas for the assessment of good risk culture such as, “tone 
from the top,” “monitoring by senior managers and board,” 
“appropriate risk appetite definition and implementation,” 
“remuneration practices,” and “escalation practices and 
policies” were propounded. The link of culture to the strat-
egy and business model of banks and the strong top-down 
approach through a strong board, CEO, and CRO were fur-
ther promoted. In this document, IA is posited as a control 
function and the third line of defense that in tandem with 
risk management and compliance is considered crucial 
for risk culture control. IA’s sufficient authority, stature, 
independence, resources, and access to the Board are pos-
ited as crucial for its usefulness in control of risk culture. 
This document recognizes the problem with the IA func-
tion in banks: The financial crisis, and more importantly 
recent events, demonstrates that internal audit functions 
should be empowered to constitute an effective third line 
of defense.
Concrete quantitative indicators such as “number of audit 
findings not being closed,” “number of risk limits breached 
and their cause,” “the manner in which problems identified 
in IA reports are addressed,” “the preexisting awareness of 
the problems by the board,” and “employee survey results” 
were promoted as reliable indicators for indirect monitor-
ing and control of culture. The document also related risk 
culture to operational risk management culture.
Risk culture is also related to operational risk in 
part because operational risk includes people risk: 
(i) inadequate training; (ii) insufficient personnel 
needed to perform required tasks adequately; (iii) 
dependency on a limited number of qualified persons 
(e.g., key person dependency); (iv) misalignment of 
business objectives and compensation programs; and 
(v) inadequate mindset of control teams.
It was not until February 2013, when the thematic 
review on risk governance was finalized that a clear line 
of thought linking risk culture control to risk governance 
appeared. The board, top management, and control sys-
tems (risk management, IA, compliance, and corporate 
governance) and failure of banks during the financial crisis 
motivated this document.
The idea of firms controlling risk culture took root 
through the efforts of the FSB when, after several round 
tables with the industry experts (informant 18), the FSB 
published a consultation document on controlling risk 
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culture in 2013. This document catapulted the FSB as the 
opinion builder among the regulators.
In its contemporary debates, the FSB acknowledges the 
non-measurability and intangibility of risk culture. On the 
issue of the calculability of risk culture, the informant 18 
bluntly said, We do not measure risk culture. You should talk 
to firms – culture is very firm driven. We issue guidance to 
help authorities assess risk culture. The non-measurability 
of risk culture was translated into propounding qualita-
tive assessment areas: tone from the top, accountability of 
employees, effective communication from the board, and 
incentive check in organizations.
It is hard to quantify [culture] right. Therefore, what 
we are saying is to look into the culture and conduct 
related aspect in risk appetite framework, assessment, 
and incentive plans. And to look at what the tone at the 
top is? (Informant 18)
Although informant 18 refrained from the quantitative 
reductionism of culture, upon further queries on what quan-
titative indicators could be suitable, the informant suggested, 
No. of complaints to the managers, response of managers 
to the complaints. Customer feedback and things like that. 
These indicators could give a gauge on culture in a more 
quantitative way. The avoidance of the quantitative reduc-
tion of risk culture was promoted on two grounds: (a) the 
policy-driven mandate of the FSB
We are at the ten thousand  [feet] level. We issue the 
guidance and how it is implemented varies across the 
jurisdictions. […] The work we are doing is very pol-
icy driven. (Informant 18)
And (b) the non-intervention in banking business models
We are not in the business of getting involved with 
banks’ business model and trying to shape them. We 
recognize that this has to be driven by management 
(Informant 18)
Although direct involvement of the FSB on IA matters 
of risk culture was not highlighted, the broad goal for the 
IA of risk culture indicated IA as a control and governance 
mechanism.
I do not know if FSB will go into too many details on 
internal audit. But I mean there will be a useful role 
of control for internal audit in this space. […] How-
ever, the Guidelines on culture and toolkits [includ-
ing IA] to assess them are very important for align-
ing the behavior of the employees (Informant 18)
The FSB informant (18) also highlighted the currently 
undergoing projects to look deeper into the misconduct 
issues, scientific view on culture, and proposal of a toolkit 
to assess culture. Informant 18 further stated, the next 
phase of culture work will begin next year (referring to 
2018) and hesitantly disclosed we will not only look at 
risk culture but overall culture. On what kind of assess-
ment tools will be included, informant 18 suggested that 
there will be no direct way to the measurement on culture 
but emphasized qualitative areas of assessment on non-
financial incentives and escalation policy.
In contrast to the risk appetite and risk governance led 
context of the FSB, the IA of risk culture at the BCBS 
evolved from discussions of internal control, IA, and 
corporate governance. The first standalone internal con-
trol guideline of 1998 by the BCBS recognized boards’ 
importance in creating a control culture to curb excessive 
risk-taking. The high-level guidelines of the BCBS on IA 
(consultation in 2011 and finalization in 2012) did not 
even mention risk culture or culture once.
The first standalone corporate governance guideline by 
the BCBS in 1999 only mentioned “culture” to caution 
banks’ board to draft their compensation and remunera-
tion policies in accordance with the culture. This rhetoric 
continued in the consultations and guidelines on corpo-
rate governance proposed by the BCBS until 2010. The 
new high-level guidelines on corporate governance (con-
sultation in 2014 and finalization in 2015) by the BCBS 
mentioned for the first time the risk culture concept and 
its audit and control.
One of the primary objectives of this revision is to 
explicitly reinforce the collective oversight and risk 
governance responsibilities of the board. Another 
important objective is to emphasize key components 
of risk governance such as risk culture, risk appe-
tite and their relationship to a bank’s risk capacity. 
(Corporate governance final document 2015, page 4)
This document referred to the FSB documents, which 
had started appearing in parallel. Our informant suggested 
that the corporate governance of the BCBS was profoundly 
influenced by the risk governance framework of the FSB.
Our [many] recommendations on the risk governance 
framework has been embedded in the Basel Commit-
tee corporate-governance framework. (Informant 18)
As exemplified in the quotes below, the BCBS also linked 
the culture audit to the secondary system of risk govern-
ance and risk appetite and promoted audit as an independ-
ent internal control mechanism whose primary aim was to 
monitor and control the issues:
The third line of defense consists of an independent 
and effective IA function. Among other things, it pro-
vides independent review and assurance on the quality 
and effectiveness of the bank’s risk governance frame-
work including links to organizational culture, as well 
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as strategic and business planning, compensation and 
decision-making processes. Internal auditors must be 
competent and appropriately trained and not involved 
in developing, implementing or operating the risk 
management function. (Corporate governance consul-
tation document 2014, page 10; Corporate governance 
final document 2015, page 11)
This was emphasized by the BCBS informant (17) when 
he linked IA to the “culture of control” discussion: IA is 
before all internal. And the competence of internal auditors 
is to understand the controls and then you also need the bank 
to understand the controls and the existence of a culture of 
control. On risk culture audit, informant 17 suggested that it 
should include the entire universe of a bank: In addition, as 
we know, the scope of internal audit that is the audit universe 
is all the units in a bank. Therefore, nothing should be left 
unaudited [concerning risk culture] ranging from trading 
desk to the compliance department to the risk management 
function, procurement, HR including payrolls—you name it. 
The informant also suggested looking at the psychological 
and organizational aspects to assess culture:
You also want to take into account some other aspects. 
[…] the psychology of the different actors and behav-
ioral science and organizational aspects (Informant 17)
However, on quantification, the BCBS informant raised a 
word of caution by saying,
I think it would be dangerous in such a field [referring 
to risk culture] with internal audit, internal control, 
corporate governance to limit to view through quanti-
tative analysis (Informant 17)
In the European context, the EBA’s predecessor—the 
Committee of European Banking Supervisors—issued con-
sultation paper CP243 (in July 2009 and finalized as CP25 in 
2010) focusing on the “High-level principles for risk man-
agement” and included the control of risk culture. These 
documents loosely coupled risk culture with risk governance 
and communication issues.
Institutions must implement a consistent risk culture 
and establish sound risk governance supported by an 
appropriate communication policy (CP 24, page 3; CP 
25, page 3)
The IA of risk culture approach was further refined in 
detail in the governance frameworks of CP44 and GL44 in 
October 2010 and September 2011, respectively, by pushing 
IA as a control function. Moving from the traditional broad 
principles on IA, in 2016, the EBA followed the FSB and 
tightly linked the IA of risk culture with the risk appetite and 
risk governance type secondary systems in its new consulta-
tion on governance. Here, again IA is conceived as a control 
mechanism that monitors deviations through metrics.
In particular, the institution should ensure that quali-
fication of the IA function and its resources, in par-
ticular the monitoring tools and risk analysis methods, 
are in adequacy with its size, locations and the nature, 
scale and complexity of the risks associated with the 
institution’s model and business activities and risk 
culture and risk appetite. (EBA/CP/2016/16, Page 49)
Normalizers: Balancing Control and Empowerment 
with Assemblages of Ideas and Toolkits
To understand the normalizers’ viewpoints on the IA of risk 
culture, we focused on the three normalizers: the Institute 
of Internal Auditors (IIA), the Committee of Sponsoring 
Organizations of the Tredway Commission (COSO), and the 
Institute of Risk Management (IRM). The reason behind the 
selection of these normalizers was twofold: first, their strong 
presence and influence and second, their recent interest in 
the IA of risk culture to keep their “thought leadership.”
The IIA approaches on the IA of risk culture focus on 
risk appetite as the first system for identifying how to audit 
risk culture:
First thing to look at is to make sure that financial 
services firms have a risk appetite framework on how 
much risk are they going to expose their capital to, 
which actually is other people’s money. (Informant 20)
However, in so doing, the IIA warns against applying the 
traditional models of IA as a control mechanism to guide the 
conduct of employees.
There are many models that look at the components 
of organizational culture. It is, however, dangerous to 
reduce work on culture and behavior into one set of 
indicators based on a particular model. There is no 
one-size-fits-all solution to auditing culture as organi-
zations can be very different, even if they are produc-
ing the same or similar outputs.” Chief Executive of 
Chartered Institute of Internal Auditors, UK (Char-
tered Institute of Internal Auditors 2014)
The IIA also identified challenges with techniques of IA 
applied to risk culture, namely, the inadequacy of surveys 
and interviews in gathering evidence and the requirement of 
judgment as a subjective element on the part of the auditors.
I think with the soft aspects; you should aim to get a 
lot of answers. In this, survey and questionnaires can 
support you if you define these instruments in a simi-
3 This consultation was mandated by the G-20 leaders’ declaration of 
15 November 2008.
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lar way. Thus, these instruments reduce the collection 
bias. Whereas interviews have collection biases that 
you ask different interviewees differently and are dif-
ficult to scale. (Informant 19)
You cannot rely merely on data and examination of 
documents. The soft aspects highlighted from inter-
views and surveys along with judgment by the auditor 
plays an important role in the effective assessment of 
risk culture (Informant 19)
Remedies by embedding risk culture in all audits were 
suggested. Informant 20 suggested, There is a choice to be 
made on whether to carry out IA of risk culture separately 
or not. The risk culture survey and interview responses 
could be biased if conducted separately since people can 
twist behavioral and cultural survey and interview responses 
purposefully. However, if risk culture audit is embedded in 
every audit, you could remove some of these biases.
Although the IIA approaches were cautionary, they 
did not provide concrete examples of how to be cautious. 
The risk culture manual shared by the IIA did not sug-
gest any specific behavioral approach until organizations 
become mature and simply enumerated the FSB’s indica-
tors. Here, the informants and the documents suggested that 
IA should assume a consulting role in organizations start-
ing risk culture implementations but an assurance role in 
organizations with growing maturity of implementations. 
Furthermore, apart from the traditional approaches of IA as 
a control mechanism, the IIA suggested the self-guidance of 
conduct by empowered employees.
We want to make sure that the first line of defense that 
is the managers and operational employees in the line 
are proactively evaluating all types of risk that they are 
exposed to. (Informant 20)
To foster employee self-guidance, the IIA promoted train-
ing and self-assessment on root cause analysis, cultural dis-
semination, and ethics (Chartered Institute of Internal Audi-
tors 2014). Informant 20 further added, We also encourage 
internal auditors to ask the question why do you think this 
problem happens? We do this so that they can get to the root 
cause when it comes to actual audit. The IIA also promoted 
collaboration with compliance functions by using its report 
and verification as an additional cushion of control:
I do think that other areas could help with the risk 
culture. Compliance being the second line could help 
since risk culture is so much embedded in so many of 
the regulatory requirements. […] IA could rely on the 
compliance function and its report. […] While talk-
ing about using compliance report, we always promote 
internal auditors to ascertain the veracity of those 
reports. (Informant 20)
Furthermore, on compensation-related issues, the IIA 
promoted the involvement of human resource functions:
As part of a culture audit, IA could collaborate with 
the human resources in understanding the compensa-
tion and employee welfare and other aspects by intro-
ducing a few questions to the human resource surveys, 
which are already conducted within organizations. 
(Informant 20)
In summary, the IIA promoted both enhancements of IA 
as a control mechanism by utilizing behavioral indicators 
as well as training to empower employees in controlling 
their conduct. Inadequate skills of current internal auditors, 
problems with reporting integrity, and IA as a part of the 
risk culture itself were highlighted as problems with the risk 
culture audit approach (Chartered Institute of Internal Audi-
tors 2014). Ethics were consequently highly promoted in the 
IIA general training programs:
We have not identified any specific training regarding 
business ethics and risk culture. We do talk about eth-
ics in our beginner and advanced training and certifica-
tion modules. (Informant 19)
The IIA informants’ interviews and documents reveal 
their reliance on the COSO framework. Consequently, we 
also examined evolution of the risk culture concept in the 
COSO publications. The risk culture debate in the COSO 
framework is linked to the “control environment” element of 
their internal control framework of 1992. The framework of 
1992 does not use culture as an explicit term but refers 
to five broad principles that cover aspects of risk culture 
indirectly.
[…] I would point back to the concept of control 
environment in the internal control framework of 
COSO [of 1992]. The internal control framework is 
old, but the risk culture term has gained popular-
ity after the financial crisis of 2008. Within the five 
principles of the control environment of the COSO 
framework, we cover broadly the risk culture with-
out using the term explicitly: commitment to integ-
rity and ethical values, independence of the board 
of directors, transparent reporting lines, recruitment 
and nurturing employees to meet control environ-
ment objectives, accountability of individuals. 
(Informant 20)
Our analysis further  indicates that the COSO inter-
nal control framework of 1992, its update in 2013, and 
subsequent clarification (e.g., the three lines of defense 
and regulations in 2015) continue the indirect discus-
sion on risk culture by referring to the setting, evaluat-
ing, and monitoring of the appropriate level of risks (risk 
appetite) at the firm policy level. In line with the internal 
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control framework of 1992, the Enterprise Risk Manage-
ment (ERM) framework of 2004 also supports risk appe-
tite setting, evaluation, and monitoring. Starting in 2009, 
the COSO publications include a direct reference to risk 
culture in the discussions on policy setting and board 
oversight. A need for a risk-aware culture is promoted, 
citing the embeddedness of the risk management system 
in the organizational culture. Informant 20 ascribed this 
shift to the strong emergence of the risk culture discus-
sion in regulatory circles. By 2010, risk oversight became 
embedded with qualitative indicators of assessment and 
monitoring culture, incentive, and tone of the top manage-
ment on risk appetite and culture. From 2011 onwards, the 
ideas on organizational culture affecting key risk indica-
tors (KRIs) and senior managers setting and disseminat-
ing policy on risk culture started emerging as part of risk 
appetite discussions. By 2012, the awareness of culture 
among employees as well as measuring and monitoring 
through workshops and surveys appeared as an impor-
tant discussion of embracing risk management. All these 
efforts on risk oversight, KRIs, and risk appetite culmi-
nated in the 2017 COSO ERM framework linking enter-
prise risk management to culture and reinforcing the role 
of senior managers and boards in setting, disseminating, 
and monitoring culture.
In line with the COSO and the IIA development, the 
IRM’s understanding on culture also emerges in their risk 
appetite framework of 2011 where advice on designing 
risk appetite (appropriate level of risk-taking) considering 
“risk management culture” and “control culture” of the 
organizations is propounded. Here, risk appetite is linked 
to the corporate governance (guidance and control from 
the board). Furthermore, in line with the IIA, the IRM 
directly proposed a behavioral approach to risk in 2012:
What is missing is the behavioral element: why do 
individuals, groups and organizations behave the way 
they do, and how does this affect all aspects of the 
management of risk? (IRM risk management frame-
work, 2012)
This behavioral approach to risk was rendered concrete by 
indicating the use of personality tools to measure individu-
als’ attitudes as indicators of risk culture.
It is possible to measure predisposition to risk by use 
of personality assessment tools. Their basic rationale 
is that, with regard to risk-taking, people vary enor-
mously. (IRM risk management framework, 2012)
The IRM did not propound a direct approach to the IA of 
risk culture but noted that a mere culture of control would be 
unable to encourage employees to behave appropriately, and 
it thus promoted personality assessment to help empower 
employees to make appropriate decisions:
Taxi drivers and airline pilots are routinely given per-
sonality tests to determine how effectively they can 
exhibit self-control under stress – we should be ready 
to look at other key staff, managers and board members 
in the same way. (IRM risk management framework, 
2012)
Furthermore, while promoting the control of risk cul-
ture, the IRM proposed verifying not only the “tone at the 
top” but also the “tone at the bottom” and “at the individual 
level.” Although the IRM emphasized “well-engineered” 
culture, it was not restricted to the idea that dysfunctionality 
or deviation from norms results in problems within organiza-
tions. The IRM recognized risk culture as a complex issue 
and emphasized that too tight control of behavior could also 
fail within organizations.
Consultants: Comprehensive Control, Employee 
Empowerment
Our analysis suggests that the consultants identified the issue 
of risk culture in the last decade and promoted a variety of 
branded approaches, e.g., Deloitte’s intelligent risk culture 
model, E&Y’s behavioral model, and KPMG’s and PwC’s 
risk culture models. Most of these approaches recognized 
risk appetite and governance as crucial for risk culture con-
trol and typically proposed a comprehensive control frame-
work, promoting the involvement of the entire organization.
It is about [all] people and how do they manage risks. 
It is not only about spreadsheets, modeling, and math-
ematical issues.” (Informant 14)
A robust and pervasive risk culture throughout the firm 
is essential. This risk culture should be embedded in 
the way the firm operates and should cover all areas 
and activities, with particular care not to limit risk 
management to specific business areas or to have it 
operate only as an audit or control function.” (Deloitte 
2015)
This comprehensive control framework relied on self-
assessment, tracking tools, risk controls, and various 
indicators.
What we have done in these cases are tracking, having 
risk controls, a report regarding different indicators 
and propose self-assessment from board level and so 
on.” (Informant 13)
The proposed  control frameworks were fluid, and 
their implementation allowed accommodating the bank’s 
internal worldviews as well as that of regulations.
If you then take a step back and think about the differ-
ent banks, they all have their own sort of ideal of what 
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the world looks like and that explains how they build 
up their internal control structure, how they build up 
their accounting framework and their own interpreta-
tion of what the original regulations meant and they 
are trying to reconcile it with a new set of regulations.” 
(Informant 12)
Although consultants suggested flexible approaches 
involving all employees, they consented that it is easier to 
get boards’ attention than that of the line managers.
It is not hard to get attention from the board level. But 
it is tougher to get attention from the line manager 
level. Because line managers, they have many things 
to manage.” (Informant 13)
This apathy from the line managers was blamed on the 
lack of a process view that permeates banking organizations.
There is a lack of process view. Big banks have been 
too much concerned about money here money there. 
They fail to have the process view.” (Informant 13)
Furthermore, consultants suggested that boards worry 
about having a “grip on the culture related things” and are 
keen to have “measures and risk indicators that can help 
evaluate, control and mitigate risks.” along with, “incen-
tives” and “education” to align the employees to the broader 
vision (Informant 13).
To make line managers and employees aware of and 
accountable for their responsibilities, consultants suggested 
empowering them through training and self-assessment 
tests. Consultants rationalized training and self-assessment 
by arguing that employees make many decisions in organi-
zations, and educated employees contribute to better risk 
culture through their independent behaviors on risk-related 
choices:
The institution provides and requires core training, 
professional development and assessment to ensure 
the bounds of acceptable and unacceptable behavior 
are understood. (E&Y 2014)
Employees have the skills necessary to complete 
what is asked of them, and feel comfortable to ask 
questions or pose challenge (KPMG 2016)
But without training, there is no basis for critical 
thinking and judgment around risk decision-making 
(KPMG 2014)
Regarding assessment of culture, the consultants pro-
posed assessing tools on the individual level that measured 
identity, belonging and behavior (Informant 14). In fact, 
the consultants agreed that most of the metrics of culture 
were old and were linked to the application of cultural 
tools involving organizational psychology to measure 
the people dimension of risks and alignment of culture 
endeavors (Informant 14).
At PwC, our approach is to reach below the surface 
of the traditional internal audit to shed some light on 
the culture and behaviors that underpin effective cor-
porate controls. We include behavioral psychologists 
– and their methodologies – as an integral part of the 
team in a range of audits and reviews, providing both 
qualitative and quantitative risk culture feedback.” 
(PwC 2009)
In doing so, consultants recognized the delicate balance 
between control and empowerment:
Ensuring that people within an organization behave 
with integrity and in accord with the values and 
goals of the firm depends upon the balance between 
the firms’ stated rules and expectations, referred to 
as the entity-level instruments, and other factors that 
frame and condition an individual’s expectations of 
proper behavior, the cultural drivers. (KPMG 2016)
EY’s model incorporates the “tangible” elements of 
organizational structures and risk management sys-
tems (the culture mechanisms) with the more “intan-
gible” elements of behavior. (E&Y 2015)
The measurement and reporting approaches of the 
consultants were also flexible and adaptable, where their 
clients could define what they want to measure and what 
they want to report (Informant 13). Consultants argued 
that mere measurement, evaluation, and monitoring could 
attract a senior manager’s attention if the trends reveal 
something unusual (Informant 13). Some consultants 
argued that mismatch between banks’ old models and lan-
guage makes it difficult to implement changes in culture.
This causes quite a lot of work, quite a lot of worries 
I would say, because suddenly you’re going to get 
something that doesn’t fit in with your old model, 
with your old language so to speak. And I believe that 
the banks are really struggling with this because it’s 
at the core of their business model. (Informant 12)
One of the consultants went on to explain that the prob-
lem was not measuring culture instead of changing it. 
Informant 14 noted: It is one thing to measure it [risk cul-
ture]. It could definitely be measured [to some extent]. But 
the problem is how to fix it. The other consultant pointed 
to the judgment and flexibility required for the assessment 
of culture:
There’s also a lot of conceptual issues and a lot 
of judgment, and that’s the interesting part of it. 
(Informant 12)
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Here, consultants specifically pointed to challenges 
with corporate governance, internal control, and IA. Con-
sultants proposed that creating procedures and level of 
checking as well as independence were of utmost impor-
tance for all governance functions (Informant 13). Some 
consultants argued that internal auditors need to be inde-
pendent enough to challenge the risk control functions in 
their approach to control (Informant 12).
Hence, consultants proposed validation and check from 
IA as well as external consultants (Informant 13). Some 
consultants proposed pattern matching and big data analy-
sis to understand behavioral issues where such data were 
available (Informant 13). They argued that it is subjec-
tive and requires appropriate judgment and education 
of the board members and control functions (Informant 
13). The consultants criticized the traditional IA practices 
of control as debilitating and recognized that the tradi-
tional notions of IA do not empower employees, and thus, 
employees do not take ownership of risks:
While we recognize that the 2013 FSB guidance has 
called on IA to report on effectiveness of risk appe-
tite frameworks, it has not recognized the debilitating 
impact of regulators continuing to support the tradi-
tional IA paradigm […] which promotes avoidance 
of risk ownership. – Risk Oversight responding to 
FSB risk culture paper
Implementers: Control and Compliance
On the issue of risk culture, the implementers pro-
moted the traditional “control of the control” model of 
IA and involvement with corporate governance. Inform-
ant 8 remarked, We [risk control] are more involved in 
the development, check whether the model is compliant, 
and IA must verify whether what we do is correct in our 
work. So, they verify our process of validation, testing, 
and analysis. Even audit manuals emphasized such views 
explicitly:
IA must control that the Bank has to adopt suitable 
devices for corporate governance and adequate mech-
anisms of management and control. (Large Bank-2 
Audit Manual- referring to all IA work including risk 
culture)
The traditional “control of the control” model of IA 
by the implementers could be justified considering their 
demand concerning ambiguous guidance on the issue of 
risk culture audit:
There are no consistent standards, no consistent guid-
ance, no tools, […]. It’s all new, uncharted territory. 
With Sarbanes-Oxley, there were defined steps sup-
ported by guidance. But with auditing culture, there 
is a lack of clear guidance from regulators about what 
they’re looking for. (IIA workshop document quoting 
chief audit executive-1)
“Verification,” “identification of irregularities,” and 
“operational errors” were the buzzwords that implementers 
related quite frequently to IA approaches.
The auditors have to check if the main information 
given is correct or not. (Informant 7)
When we carry out an audit, and we identify irregu-
larities in processes. (Informant 9)
“We have recently been discussing at work what hap-
pens. […] if something goes wrong [at the fund com-
panies]? If something is […] calculated in a wrong 
way and some people have sold and bought units on 
that. So this is a debate that we have […] how […] can 
you develop internal systems and internal control to 
avoid this. (Informant 1)
The verifications proposed were of three types. First, the 
documental analysis was purported to evaluate the adequacy 
of the documentation by verifying the official documenta-
tion produced by the different functions. Second, empirical 
analysis of data was promoted to ensure the level of imple-
mentation and performance of processes/systems. Third, 
practice verifications using interviews and on-site visits 
were suggested. However, these verification principles were 
high-level, and their actual implementation was left to lower-
level operations (IA manual of large bank 2). As informant 7 
noted, Then you have cultural problems, cultural differences 
actually […], that you need to somehow take into considera-
tion. And then you have the relationship between head office 
and subsidiary, which somehow creates situations that you 
have to be, how can I say, to be able to differentiate between 
different situations. The verification approaches also pro-
moted the traceability of evidence:
If you ask the insurance manager, do our sales people 
receive training […], but then he’d say yes. I want to 
see some proof like certification, e-learning certifica-
tion for example. What is not written does not exist in 
our world. (Informant 4)
To achieve traceability, the implementers recommended 
formalization and documentation of line management activi-
ties and sought their involvement in this regard. As inform-
ant 4 recalled, Even the activities to be carried out by line 
management have to be formalized in some way. […] It has 
to be formalized because we need proof of it. In case we 
get an inquiry from supervisory authorities or the board. 
Informant 10 suggested employee participation in this pro-
cess of formalization: What you would do is you would 
initially have all the interviews with them (employees) to 
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understand what are the developments, what are their objec-
tives, what do they plan for the future? You would collect 
a lot of information, and you would do your own analysis. 
Then you would do the risk assessment how you see where 
the biggest risks are. Then you will go to them and say, Well 
this is how we see the risk. How do you see the risks?
Despite promoting the involvement of employees and the 
first line of defense, the board’s guidance on risk appetite 
and level of risk-taking was identified as crucial.
What we’re trying to do is to strengthen the first line 
of defense regarding risk management. […] We have 
appointed risk owners to make sure that we all mention 
the risks in line with the decided risk cap types that are 
decided by the Board. (Informant 5)
The risk appetite framework and governance process 
and its embedding at all levels of the organization will 
help to make the risk culture tangible by promoting 
and enabling the right understanding and conversations 
at all levels.- HSBC responding to FSB risk culture 
paper
The proper implementation of board-driven risk appetite 
and involvement of the first line of defense, i.e., employees, 
was reinforced through proper compensation frameworks and 
monitoring by the control functions.
On a daily basis, we’re monitoring the risk, manag-
ing the risk evolvement or development to make sure 
that the company is managed within the decided risk 
cap size. So, these figures are frequently monitored. 
(Informant 5)
We believe many mechanisms support the develop-
ment of a sound risk culture including (but not limited 
to) the compensation framework, the performance 
assessment process, and the risk appetite and risk man-
agement frameworks. - - Deutsch Bank responding to 
FSB risk culture paper
Even advanced approaches demonstrated the control 
and monitoring-based understanding of the IA of risk cul-
ture. Informant 18 (of the FSB), reflecting on her recent 
banking risk culture workshop, remarked, Some banks 
are using big data to monitor their risk culture. They can 
analyze the behavioral patterns of the big data to assess 
culture.
The IA processes of implementers focused on meas-
urement, reporting, and issue-handling processes, as well. 
informant 4 remarked, [Y]ou need to measure it, you need to 
steer it, you need to follow up and report it, and these four 
steps are critical in the first line of defense work within the 
financial institution. Measurements and reporting especially 
involved metrics such as inadequate training, ineffective pro-
cesses, or lack of procedures.
Our reports will include issues that are symptoms of 
broader culture issues within a business area such 
as inadequate training, ineffective processes, or lack 
of procedures, and we will work with the appropri-
ate level of management to develop action plans that 
adequately address the underlying root cause. (IIA 
case-document quoting IA head-1)
It includes such elements as a history of errors, a pat-
tern of repeat audit findings, concerns about manage-
ment surfaced by IA, or concerns presented to IA by 
others. (IIA case-document quoting IA head-2)
The implementers promoted a measurement and metrics-
based approach of IA of risk culture audit, arguing that met-
rics are useful for the boards to make consistent judgment 
considering the subjectivities of risk culture:
Given […] subjectivity across many jurisdictional 
boundaries, what we, as risk professionals, have to 
offer is a direction toward a quantitative floor for 
boards and their management from which to allow 
supervisors to make consistent judgments. – Blue Rib-
bon Advisory Panel of the Professional Risk Manag-
ers’ International Association responding to FSB risk 
culture paper
Apart from metrics, issue identification itself was shown 
to be valuable for promoting changes in the systems. As 
noted by Informant 5, [The] intention is to set up a form 
so we can prioritize how these incidents should be avoided 
in the future and how they should be solved, if they are not 
solved instantly, if there are many incidents – if you need to 
change the process or if you need to change the system or 
whatever. Issue identification was not considered sufficient 
for IA activities; issue-handling processes were employed 
to advise the line functions. Informant 4 remarked, No, we 
don’t [fix] the deviation, we make suggestions [on] how the 
deviation could be or should be [fixed], – we [audit and the 
auditee] agree on – there has to be a deadline timeframe. 
Here, some implementers suggested that they see themselves 
as helping to line managers.
We try to see the internal auditor as help [to the 
auditees] rather than just writing something bad 
[about them] that we found. Having open issues is 
normal. It’s perfectly fine everyone has it. If you 
don’t have them, that’s really weird. (Informant 10)
The involvement of line managers also meant that the 
issue-handling processes relied on negotiation with the 
line managers. Informant 10 remarked, When we do an 
audit, and we identify irregularities, a lot of the times 
there are process irregularities. We will report all of the 
findings, but before we report we, of course, will have the 
discussion with the auditee, and we will agree that this is 
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a problem and how we describe the problem. However, 
communication with line managers was considered tricky, 
and the informants identified compromised independence 
of the control functions in this regard:
Yes, but this is one issue that has been brought up 
from the control functions like myself [the risk con-
trol function], the compliance function and [the] IA, 
as we see that there is a risk of not being independ-
ent and that could be a risk of conflicts of interest. 
(Informant 5)
Consequently, to maintain the independence of control 
functions, some implementers even opposed the advisory 
roles attributed to control functions:
The wording seems to suggest that compliance and 
other control functions’ primary activity is to act as 
advisors. We have a strong view that these functions 
should first and foremost act as a risk control func-
tion and then secondly, and to a much lesser extent, an 
advisory function. - - HSBC responding to FSB risk 
culture paper
Although issue identification, mitigation advice, and 
reporting were carried out in consultation and communica-
tion with line managers, issue closing was dependent on 
verification. As noted by informant 10: Well you have a lot 
of communication on open issues, right. Because for exam-
ple these open issues that are in our system they need to 
get closed. Whenever something has been done to close the 
issues, then we have to look at it and ascertain that it’s really 
been closed.
We speculate that the implementers stuck to the tradi-
tional view of IA as verification because they recognized 
that controlling the behaviors of employees (such as compli-
ance to a set rule or adherence to policies) was essential in 
curbing problems within organizations. Hence, the focus of 
IA and control was on reducing dysfunctionality or inten-
tional breaches of policies from employees.
We agree that non-adherence to a code of conduct 
should affect compensation and career prospects. - 
World Savings and Retail Banking Institute (WSRBI) 
responding to FSB risk culture paper
It should be clearly stated that only those breaches 
in internal policies, procedures and risk limits which 
prove to be intentional should have an impact on the 
compensation and career of the employees that are 
responsible for them. - - WSRBI responding to FSB 
risk culture paper
The implementers also resented the tight guidelines of the 
regulatory authorities. For example, the implementers and 
their associations opposed detailed recommendation on risk 
appetite by the regulators:
While DB’s current risk appetite framework is largely 
in line with the principles, we are concerned that a 
requirement to establish risk limits at a legal entity 
level is too broad-reaching. – Deutsch bank on risk 
appetite framework by the FSB
It should thus be mentioned that, even though setting 
definitions may be useful, institutions shall retain some 
flexibility in the way they will articulate their own 
framework and in the key elements they wish to use in 
order to do so. - - French Banking Federation on risk 
appetite framework by the FSB
However, when the regulators issued risk culture guide-
line, the implementers and their lobbying organizations 
opposed such measures by saying that risk appetite was 
enough:
We feel, however, that the Risk Appetite Framework 
(RAF) is the embodiment of an institution’s risk cul-
ture and that it is unnecessary to go beyond assessing 
the robustness of the RAF […]. Therefore, the guide-
lines for assessing risk culture should avoid adding 
new layers or expectations of new processes being cre-
ated and leverage existing tools and requirements to 
assess risk culture – CRO forum on risk culture
To keep the control loose, the implementers demanded 
fluidity in IA guidelines, a “rules-based approach,” and 
“tools” from the regulators:
All the tools listed here may be helpful, but it is impor-
tant that the final guidance is clear that no suite of tools 
should be considered as a checklist for either manage-
ment or supervisors. - Deutsch Bank responding to 
FSB risk culture paper
Practitioner-based organizations helped implementers in 
promoting their views. In this regard, the discussion with the 
FSB informant revealed an influential body of practitioners 
known as the G30. The G30 introduced its views on risk 
culture, its audit, and supervision in October 2013. In this 
document, the G30 moved from the issue of risk govern-
ance and risk appetite to risk culture, thereby latching on 
to the existing secondary system for verification. Although 
the G30 did not detail the IA of risk culture, it indicated that 
compliance with an a priori set standard was the preferred 
way to audit risk culture in banks. The G30 later confirmed 
this in a separate document in 2015 by recommending the 
development of a comprehensive set of indicators to moni-
tor and assess individual and team adherence to firm values 
and desired conduct.” (G30, Banking Conduct and Culture 
document, page 50). The G30 also recommended upgrading 
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of the IA “skill set” and strengthening of the “organizational 
independence.” (G30, Banking Conduct and Culture docu-
ment, page 63).
Discussion
Our results, summarized in the model of Fig. 1, suggest that 
the intentions of the actors affected their broad goals on the 
IA of risk culture. Both the intentions and broad goals, in 
turn, were contingent on the history and context (Parker and 
Johnson 2017). The broad goals influenced the approaches 
of demarcation, calculation/qualculation, and techniques that 
attributed visibility and auditability to the object of IA.
Analyzing the perspectives of different actors (summa-
rized in Table 6), we can highlight that both the regulators 
and the implementers posited IA as a control mechanism 
(w.r.t risk culture) to monitor and control the behavior of 
employees. The monitoring and control were aimed at the 
conformance of employees’ conduct to codes and poli-
cies set by top management and the board. The emphasis 
on monitoring and control promoted the objectification of 
individuals’ conduct, highlighting dysfunctional and unwar-
ranted behavior as the prime reason for failures and disas-
ters (Baud and Chiapello 2016; MacLullich 2003; Vaughan 
1999). However, the two actors had divergent goals and 
political intentions. The regulators’ rationale on installing 
new self-checks and balances to curb excessive risk-taking 
by banks in the aftermath of the financial crisis was linked 
to their historical perception of IA as a control and govern-
ance mechanism (Chambers 2014; Collier and Zaman 2005; 
Mihret 2014; Sarens et al. 2013). However, contrary to the 
recent thesis of Baud and Chiapello (2016), the regulators, 
in our case, still believed in self-regulation and hesitated to 
suggest a strict approach to the IA of risk culture (Power 
1997, 1999). The implementers, in contrast, promoted the 
status quo of IA avoiding costly implementations, fear-
ing intervention in the profiteering activities by regulators 
(Wahlström 2006, 2009).
The regulators and the implementers reached the IA of 
risk culture in steps that involved making risk culture vis-
ible with existing systems of risk appetite and risk govern-
ance. Furthermore, both the regulators and the implement-
ers focused on the four qualitative areas of assessment: 
presence of the definition of risk culture, risk appetite, and 
risk governance in policy documents; communication of 
such definitions to employees; monitoring by the board; 
and promotion of “appropriate” behavior through incen-
tives. None of these areas of assessment were new (Abbott 
et al. 2010; Morgan 1980), but they were adapted to include 
the elements of risk culture. While suggesting such sim-
plistic adaptations, the regulators and the implementers 
accepted the inadequacy of the calculability of risk culture, 
the requirement of the involvement of all employees, and 
the ineffectiveness of the traditional IA outcomes (Power 
1999). Although the regulators noted “problems” with the 
existing practices of IA, they thought it to be irrelevant 
when it came to modifying the IA techniques. In maintain-
ing status quo and avoiding investments, the implementers 
also favored the inclusion of risk culture elements in their 
existing routines of IA. In summary, both actors endorsed 
the adaptation of existing IA techniques, such as tracing 
evidence in interviews, surveys, and documents informing 
on protocols, process ownership, and departments (Norman 
et al. 2010; Power 1999, 2000).
Fig. 1  Internal auditing 
approaches for risk culture
Making the object of audit 
visible and auditable
Demarcaon of 
the object of audit
Calculaon/Qual-
culaon
Techniques
Broad Goals Intenons
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In contrast to the regulators and the implementers, the 
normalizers and the consultants propounded IA as a control 
mechanism coupled with the empowerment of the first line 
of defense (employees). The empowerment included training 
and allowing employees to freely raise their views (Foucault 
1988b; Townley 1994). The normalizers’ documents reveal 
that they worked regularly with consultants in develop-
ing their framework, and thus, the consultants’ viewpoints 
affected them (Hayne and Free 2014). The normalizers also 
wanted to legitimize their expertise as thought leaders. Con-
sequently, the normalizers tied their view on the IA of risk 
culture to their professional frameworks (Roussy and Brivot 
2016). Motivated to keep their thought leadership, the nor-
malizers reconciled efforts from the regulators and the con-
sultants to promote a library of toolkits and a bricolage of 
ideas to guide implementing organizations. The consultants 
were interested in positing IA as a part of a comprehensive 
control framework within organizations. Apart from their 
not-so-narrow focus on IA, consultants idea to sell solutions 
and monetize them played an important role in addressing 
the IA of risk culture as a paradigmatic change (Christensen 
and Skærbæk 2010).
Similar to the regulators and implementers, the normal-
izers and the consultants relied on the concepts of risk appe-
tite and risk governance to render risk culture visible. How-
ever, these actors emphasized the assessment of risk culture 
through psychological and behavioral measurements using 
surveys and interviews. In doing so, these actors acknowl-
edged that the business of banking is based on appropriate 
risk exploitation and risk-taking (Mikes 2009; Palermo et al. 
2016). Consequently, these actors also proposed training, 
employee participation and self-assessment of employees 
that could enable employees to make informed decisions on 
risk-taking (Foucault 1988b; Miller and Rose 2008; Rose 
and Miller 1992). To sum up, these groups of actors under-
stood that human beings could be empowered by expertise 
and knowledge to mobilize the appropriate contextual con-
duct (Dean 1999, p. 22), allowing them to be critical deci-
sion makers (McCabe 2014).
The heterogeneity of the conceptions of IA among dif-
ferent stakeholders might seem unsurprising given the 
ambiguity of the object of IA (risk culture in our case) and 
the variety of current IA practices. However, our findings 
reveal several relevant theoretical implications. First, the 
absence of the implementers’ support or coercive regula-
tion on changing the conventional IA notions and tech-
niques raises doubt on whether IA in the near term would 
be able to break free from its current paradigm of securing 
tangible processes to the new paradigm of securing indi-
vidual motivations and attitudes of the employees guided 
by risk culture and ethical values within organizations. 
There is a danger that a direct transfer of knowledge, with-
out critical considerations on intangibility of risk culture, Ta
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could lead to ritualistic thinking among implementers, pro-
moting an ineffective tick-box-based compliance approach 
of IA in controlling culture (McCabe 2014; Power 1999). 
Second, the current control and governance focus of the 
different stakeholders is based on the calculation (Callon 
and Muniesa 2005; Vaivio 1999, 2006) and qualculation 
(Callon and Law 2005; Cochoy 2008) associated with tan-
gible processes that facilitate discernible trails for verifica-
tion and accountability during traditional applications of 
IA (Goodwin and Yeo 2001; Vaivio 1999, 2006). This type 
of control approach mired in calculation/qualculation, if 
extended to employees’ behavior, could rob employees of 
their individuality as well as their critical and moral think-
ing (leading to the colonization of employees’ emotional 
self) (Ezzy 2001; McCabe 2014). Third, the approaches 
of normalizers and consultants to the implementation of 
IA as a control mechanism balanced by the empowerment 
of employees through training seem theoretically plausi-
ble but could be pragmatically difficult to attain (McCabe 
2014; Simons 1995). Theoretically, empowering employees 
through training and self-assessment might help control the 
problems arising from an uncritical mechanistic approach 
of thinking and avoid colonization of the employees’ self. 
At the same time, independent and objective control by IA 
could help curb problems due to policy violation, dysfunc-
tionality, and abnormal decisions that harm organizations 
(Vaughan 1999). In practice, empowered employees could 
contribute to value creation through their innovative ideas, 
but they could also be difficult to control and could harm 
organizational well-being (Simons 1995). Also, solutions 
with a delicate balance of “control and empowerment,” 
if achieved, could be context dependent (Simons 1995). 
While the context dependency might help IA practices in 
becoming suitable to organizational ambiguities (Englund 
et al. 2013) and professionalization endeavors by requir-
ing non-transparent judgmental approaches (Power 1999), 
at the same time, it could diminish the independence and 
objectivity of IA (Christopher et al. 2009; Goodwin and 
Yeo 2001; Roussy and Brivot 2016).
Our results also raise several ethical implications for 
teams conducting IA of risk culture. First, the competency-
related deontological ethics of IA by the IIA warns IA teams 
in indulging in any activities where they lack “the neces-
sary knowledge, skills, and experience.” This means that 
IA teams would need to undergo proper training and acquire 
knowledge on assessing culture, especially psychology and 
personality of employees, before they can audit culture. Sec-
ond, since auditing culture would mean more freedom of 
judgment on a vast number of issues for the IA teams, it 
would become difficult for IA teams to ascertain the moral 
ethos of independence and objectivity in their judgment. 
Third, IA teams would be handling personality- and moti-
vation-related information of employees through survey 
instruments; this would mean that IA teams would need 
to handle such personal information of employees without 
dehumanizing employees to bits and bytes of data. Fourth, 
since IA teams would be seeking more personal informa-
tion from employees during one-to-one interviews, it might 
impair their already impaired ethos of independence and 
objectivity further because they would need to be close to 
employees in seeking such information. Fourth, if independ-
ence and objectivity form the deontological ethical frame of 
IA, then how can IA teams be independent and objective in 
auditing culture while being a part of it.
Conclusion
This paper set out to analyze how different actors—regu-
lators, normalizers, consultants, and implementers—
conceive the IA of risk culture and embrace different 
approaches to achieve this aim. Before highlighting our 
contribution, we acknowledge several limitations of our 
study and explicate avenues for future research. First, our 
study relies on heterogeneous data sources (e.g., docu-
ments drafted for different purposes) with possible impli-
cations for the reliability of the results. Hence, we promote 
future studies employing a “homogeneous” set of data gen-
erated by interviews, focus group, or experiments. Second, 
our study has not exhausted the disparate viewpoints on 
the IA of risk culture. In fact, differences in viewpoints 
may exist at different organizations and different levels 
within organizations. Consequently, we recommend fur-
ther investigation on the views of different internal stake-
holders (such as board, audit committees, internal audi-
tors, compliance team members, and risk managers) in 
different organizations. Furthermore, longitudinal research 
could inform whether the differences in the IA approaches 
to risk culture elaborated in this study will continue to 
exist or whether a new dominant approach will prevail 
over all other approaches. Third, since many studies pro-
vide evidence on IA being an ethically compromised gov-
ernance practice (Everett and Tremblay 2014; Ferry et al. 
2017; Roussy 2013; Roussy and Rodrigue 2016), it could 
be important to understand how an ethically compromised 
IA could assure and consult on risk culture and ethical 
issues. Consequently, we also promote further studies on 
the ethical dilemma faced by internal auditors in carrying 
out risk culture or ethics audit. Fourth, we limited our 
focus to auditee-related data collection techniques of IA, 
and therefore, we promote further studies on judgment 
approaches and “auditee’s account giving” as a means 
to problematize the conceptions of IA in the risk culture 
domain.
Finally, our research posits three main contributions. 
First, we contribute to understanding how IA practices could 
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include intangible objects such as risk culture and ethics. 
While our proposed framework may not be perfect and con-
crete, it does provide a helpful systematic way of thinking on 
how objects of audit could be made visible by demarcation 
(Abbott 1995; Bowker and Star 1996) and then auditable by 
measurement (Callon and Law 2005; Callon and Muniesa 
2005; Cochoy 2008) and IA techniques (Power 1999).
Second, we address scholars’ call to examine how audit 
gets accepted into new domains (Kaspersen and Johansen 
2016; Pentland 2000; Power 1996). However, in contrast to 
the existing studies on external audit expansions (Free et al. 
2009; Power 1996; Robson et al. 2007), we focused on IA 
expansions where theoretical literature is scarce (Gramling 
et al. 2004; Parker and Johnson 2017), and practices tend to 
be heterogeneous (Arena and Jeppesen 2015; Roussy and 
Brivot 2016). The unbounded and intangible nature of risk 
culture allowed us to extend the “systems of audit” concept 
currently applied to tangible processes (Power 1997, 1999) 
by including ideas on the boundaries, measurement, and audit 
approaches linked to such boundaries and measurement.
Third, we address scholars’ call to understand the mani-
fold conceptions of IA and its contextual and historical 
drivers (cf. Erasmus and Coetzee 2018; Roussy and Brivot 
2016). In doing so, we enrich the literature on the IA of 
risk culture that focused on either the contextual viewpoints 
of implementers (Carretta et al. 2017; Cornia et al. 2016; 
Palermo et al. 2016) or the regulatory viewpoints (Power 
1999; Ring et al. 2016) by highlighting its manifold notion.
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